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SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
Since the Shuttle Challenger accident in 1986, 
communities across NASA have been developing and 
extensively using quantitative reliability and risk assessment 
methods in their decision making process. This paper 
discusses several reliability engineering applications that 
NASA has used over the year to support the design, 
development, and operation of critical space flight hardware. 
Specifically, the paper discusses several reliability engineering 
applications used by NASA in areas such as risk management, 
inspection policies, components upgrades, reliability growth, 
integrated failure analysis, and physics based probabilistic 
engineering analysis. In each of these areas, the paper provides 
a brief discussion of a case study to demonstrate the value 
added and the criticality of reliability engineering in 
supporting NASA project and program decisions to fly safely. 
Examples of these case studies discussed are reliability based 
life limit extension of Shuttle Space Main Engine (SSME) 
hardware, Reliability based inspection policies for Auxiliary 
Power Unit (APU) turbine disc, probabilistic structural 
engineering analysis for reliability prediction of the SSME 
alternate turbo-pump development, impact of ET foam 
reliability on the Space Shuttle System risk, and reliability 
based Space Shuttle upgrade for safety.  
Special attention is given in this paper to the physics 
based probabilistic engineering analysis applications and their 
critical role in evaluating the reliability of NASA development 
hardware including their potential use in a research and 
technology development environment. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Reliability is the probability that an item will perform its 
intended function for a specified mission profile. High 
reliability means design it right and build it right.  To achieve 
high reliability one must: 
• Establish a reliability requirement. 
• Use qualitative and quantitative analysis methods and 
tools to verify the requirement is met. 
• Analyze the manufacturing, assembly, and test procedures 
concurrent with the design process.  
• Use concurrent engineering to get everybody involved 
upfront. 
 
As shown in Figure 1, reliability is defined in terms of design 
reliability [1] and process reliability. Design reliability is 
analyzed in many different ways. One way of evaluating 
design reliability is shown in Figure 2. In Figure 2, reliability 
is derived using design information. Specifically, reliability is 
defined as load and environment (performance) versus 
capability. On the other hand, in Figure 3, process reliability, 
is concerned with mapping the critical design parameters to 
processing, process characterization, and process control. This 
paper discusses several case studies that address both the 
design reliability and process reliability. 
 
 
Figure 1 Operational Reliability. 
 
Figure 2 Design reliability. 
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Figure 3 Process reliability. 
2 RELIABILITY APPLICATIONS 
The following sections provide examples of reliability 
studies that were used to support critical Space Shuttle 
decisions. 
2.1 A Lesson Learned in Process Reliability 
 
This case study discusses the importance of quality in 
system design, and the relationship between quality, 
reliability, and system safety for space vehicles.  
The difficulties and sensitivities of the Space Shuttle 
External Tank (ET) Thermal Protection System (TPS) manual 
spray process is a good demonstration of the impact of process 
control on component reliability and system risk. 
The TPS is a foam type material applied to ET to 
maintain cryogenic propellant quality, minimize ice/frost 
formation, and protect the structure from ascent, plume, and 
re-entry heating. Figure 4 shows the main ET components that 
have TPS foam sprayed by automated or manual processes.  
The reliability of the TPS is broadly defined as its 
strength versus the stress put on it in flight. High TPS 
reliability means less debris released and fewer hits to the 
orbiter, reducing system risk. Process control is a critical 
factor in achieving high reliability and low system risk. Good 
process uniformity and high process capability yield fewer 
process defects, smaller defect sizes, and good material 
properties that meet the engineering specification—the critical 
ingredients of high reliability and low system risk. Figure 5 
shows the impact of process control on foam process 
reliability and on system risk. Figure 6 shows the relationship 
between quality, reliability, and system risk.  These 
relationships were developed and applied as part of the post 
Columbia accident efforts to return to flight. The clear 
message from the Columbia accident and the ET TPS foam 
experience is that inadequate manufacturing and quality 
control can have a severe negative impact on component 
reliability and system safety.  It is also critical to understand 
the relationship between process control, component 
reliability, and system safety up front in the design process. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Space Shuttle External Tank (ET). 
  
Figure 5 Impact of process control on system risk. 
 
 
Figure 6 Relationships between process control, reliability, 
and system risk. 
The clear message from the Columbia accident and the 
ET TPS foam experience is that inadequate manufacturing and 
quality control can have a severe negative impact on 
component reliability and system safety.  It is also critical to 
understand the relationship between process control, 
component reliability, and system safety up front in the design 
process. 
2.2 A Reliability-Based Inspection Policy 
Post Challenger Accident, a major simulation modeling 
effort (shown in Figure 7) was conducted to evaluate the 
reliability of the Shuttle APU turbine wheel [2]. The 
simulation model was designed to determine the probability of 
failure of the APU turbine wheel due to critical blade crack 
(shown in Figure 8) given that the wheel has to operate for 
some specified life limit during which a given inspection 
policy is imposed. The simulation model also allows the 
analyst to study the trade-offs between wheel reliability, wheel 
life, inspection interval, and rejection crack size. 
Using the simulation model, analysis results showed that 
for a wheel life limit of 100 Hot Gas Starts (HGS's), an 
inspection interval of 16 HGS, and a rejection flaw size of 90 
mils, the APU reliability is estimated to be 0.99994. Based on 
these result, the program decision was to establish a 16-starts 
inspection interval and 100 starts life limit.  Inspection 
intervals could have a major impact on reliability. 
 
 
Figure 7 Shuttle APU blade crack model. 
 
Figure 8 Typical APU blade cracks. 
2.3 Reliability Based Risk Management 
As part of the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) effort to introduce the use of 
probabilistic models in managing the risk for the critical Space 
Shuttle hardware, a tool was developed [3] to derive a life 
limit for a given component subject to a specified reliability 
and confidence level requirement. The statistical tool 
developed is based on Weibull time to failure distribution, 
combined with an optimization technique used to derive the 
minimum life limit that meets the reliability requirement. The 
model that applies to components with no failure data is called 
the Weibayes. The Weibayes, which was used in this study, is 
basically a Weibull with an assumed Beta. In this study, since 
the shape parameter of the Weibull distribution varies for 
different components, an optimization technique is used in 
combination with the statistical technique to derive a life limit, 
which does not require knowledge of the shape parameter 
value. The life limit derived is constrained by a specified 
reliability and confidence level.  
The steps to determine the life limits are as follows: 
1) Make sure “no failures or major Material Review Board 
(MRB) history” 
2) Collect fleet hot fire history 
• Seconds for High Cycle Fatigue (HCF) failure mode 
application 
• Starts for Low-Cycle Fatigue (LCF) failure mode 
application (or transients for some nozzle 
applications) 
3) Make sure units for SFR calculation are from the same 
configuration or present strong argument that prior 
configurations have lower or equal reliability 
4) Input fleet data (time history) into the SFR computer 
program 
5) Run the computer program to obtain results (4 values) 
• 25th percentile fleet leader 
• 50th percentile fleet leader 
• 6th highest unit 
• SFR math model value 
6) Pick the minimum of the 50th percentile, the 6th highest, 
and the SFR math model value. 
7) If the minimum is less than the 25th percentile, use the 25th 
percentile as the life limit. 
8) If the minimum is greater than the 50th percentile use the 
50th percentile as the life limit. 
Figure 9 is an example application of the above process to 
a fuel bleed duct of the Space Shuttle Main Engine. The 
life limit derived in this case was 34th percentile. 
 
 
Figure 9 Life limits of a fuel bleed duct. 
 In summary, this case study provides a dynamic risk 
management tool to consistently and effectively determine the 
life limit of specified SSME hardware based on the fleet 
operational history. The tool developed, combined with other 
engineering considerations, is being used as part of a general 
life limit specification for the SSME. 
2.4 Reliability Tracking 
The reliability growth of a system takes place due to 
changes introduced into the system structure. These changes 
make it difficult to estimate the system reliability using a 
classical model such as the binomial model. Thus, it is 
desirable to model the growth by a "growth model." A 
reliability growth model is an analytical tool used to monitor 
the reliability progress during the developmental program, and 
to establish a test plan to demonstrate acceptable system 
reliability. Some of the advantages of using a reliability 
growth model are: 
• Determining the intensity of Test, Analyze, and Fix 
(TAAF) to reach reliability objectives. 
• Predicting whether stated reliability objectives will be 
achieved. 
• Correlating reliability changes with reliability activities 
and tracking progress. 
• Planning for a reliability demonstration test. 
The most widely used reliability growth model is the 
AMSAA. The AMSAA reliability growth model was 
developed by Crow and is reported in MIL HDBK 189. The 
AMSAA model is designed for tracking the reliability within a 
test phase and not across tests phases. The model assumes that 
within a test phase, reliability growth can be modeled as a 
non-homogeneous Poisson process (NHPP). The model 
assumes that within a test phase, the cumulative failure rate is 
linear on log-log-scale. The AMSAA model evaluates the 
reliability growth that results from the introduction of design 
fixes into the system and not the reliability growth that may 
occur at the end of a test phase due to delayed fixes.  
The AMSAA model assumes that the intensity function 
can be approximated by a continuous parametric function, i.e. 
 , (1) 
which is the Weibull failure rate function where λ is the scale 
parameter and β is the shape parameter.  Thus, the mean value 
function is 
 . (2) 
For β = 1, ρ(t) is constant, indicating an homogeneous 
Poisson process (HPP). For β < 1, ρ(t) is decreasing, 
indicating reliability growth. For β > 1, ρ(t) is increasing, 
indicating deterioration in system reliability.  It should be 
noted that the model assumes that ρ(t) is approximated by a 
Weibull intensity function and not the Weibull distribution.  
Thus, statistical techniques used for the Weibull distribution 
are not applicable to ρ(t).   
To estimate the parameters of the AMSAA model, two 
procedures exist.  One procedure is used for time terminated 
testing, and the second one is for failure terminated testing.  
The SSME used the time-terminated testing procedure.  For 
time terminated testing β is estimated by 
 , (3) 
where N = number of failures, T = accumulated test time, and 
xi = failure times.  Using β, the estimate of λ is 
 . (4) 
Using both parameter estimates, the instantaneous failure rate 
is given by: 
 , (5)  
Where, 
 . (6) 
 
Based on the data shown in Table 1 the following is an 
example from the SSME program. Using the equations above 
for the SSME data, the SSME instantaneous Mean Time 
Between Failures (MTBF) and the engine mission reliability 
are calculated and the total time of T = 373,868 sec.  The β 
and λ are determined using Equations 3 and 4: 
 . 
 
Notice that a β of 0.4278 indicates a growth.  Using these λ 
and β, the instantaneous MTBF is 68,021.  The MTBF is then 
used to calculate the engine reliability for a mission time of 
520 sec, 
 . 
 
 
Table 1 Cumulative Test Time Versus Failures. 
Failure 
i 
Cumulative Failure Time 
xi, sec 
1  505 
2  10,348 
3  10,872 
4  15,516 
5  15,844 
6    48,168 
7  48,476 
8  55,606 
9  78,724 
10  97,648 
11  158,674 
12  206,712 
13  270,242 
and the total time of T = 373,868 sec.  The β and λ are 
determined using Equations 3 and 4: 
 . 
Notice that a β of 0.4278 indicates a growth.  Using these λ 
and β, the instantaneous MTBF is 68,021.  The MTBF is then 
used to calculate the engine reliability for a mission time of 
520 sec, 
 . 
The SSME reliability growth analysis was developed after the 
Challenger accident and has been used since then. It has 
provided a tool to evaluate and track reliability, evaluate the 
effectiveness of the test program, and evaluate the 
effectiveness of design and process changes. 
2.5 Physics-Based Reliability 
Probabilistic engineering analysis is used when failure 
data is not available and the design is characterized by 
complex geometry or is sensitive to loads, material properties, 
and environments. The following is an example of a reliability 
application to an SSME bearing inner race crack problem 
(shown in Figure 10) that was solved using physics-based 
probabilistic analysis. 
 
 
Figure 10 SSME Turbo-pump bearing fracture location. 
The objective of the study [4] was to predict the 
probability of inner race over-stress under conditions 
experienced in the test rig and to estimate the effect of 
manufacturing stresses on the fracture probability. The 
simulation model used is shown in Figure 11. 
 
 
Figure 11 SSME Turbo-pump bearing simulation model. 
The result from the simulation model shown in Table 2 
led to a change in the material of the bearing inner race from 
440C to the 9310. Justification for the change in material is 
explained in Table 2.  
Table 2 Turbo-pump Bearing Analysis Results 
Test 
Failures Race Configuration 
Failures in 
100,000 
firings** 
3 of 4 440C w/ actual* mfg. stresses 68,000 
N/A 440C w/ no mfg. stresses 1,500 
N/A 440C w/ ideal mfg. stresses 27,000 
0 of 15 9310 w/ ideal mfg. stresses 10 
*ideal + abusive grinding 
**Probabilistic Structural Analysis 
3 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Quantitative reliability engineering analysis: 
• Involves more than just reliability predictions and 
reliability demonstration that are performed against a 
given program or project requirements.  
• Can play a key role in supporting abroad range of 
applications such as risk management, inspection policies, 
life limits, and design trades.  
• Analysis is critical to addressing design and 
manufacturing deficiencies. 
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